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Selected Developments in California Law
DeTomaso v. Pan American World
Airways, Inc.: Preemption of State Tort
Claims by the Railway Labor Act

The Railway Labor Act (RLA)' limits the remedies of a plaintiff
to specific grievance and arbitration procedures. 2 In DeTomaso v.
Pan American World Airways, Inc. ,3 the California Supreme Court
held that the RLA preempted state tort claims of intentional infliction
of emotional distress and defamation. 4 Preemption occurred because

the court viewed the substantive aspect of the state tort claims as
being governed by the grievance and arbitration procedures designated

in a collective bargaining agreement. 5 Consequently, the plaintiff was

precluded from asserting state tort claims stemming from the collective bargaining agreement. 6
7
Part I of this Note will examine the relationship between the RLA,

1. Railway Labor Act, Pub. L. No. 69-257, 44 Stat. 577 (1926) (codified as amended at
45 U.S.C. §§ 151-188 (1982 & Supp. III 1985)). See infra notes 64-91 and accompanying text
(discussion of the scope of the RLA). See infra notes 92-122 and accompanying text (discussion
of RLA preemption).
2. 45 U.S.C. §§ 151-188 (1945). See infra notes 82-83, 165-67 and accompanying text
(discussion of RLA grievance and arbitration procedures).
3. 43 Cal. 3d 517, 733 P.2d 614, 235 Cal. Rptr. 292 (1987).
4. DeTomaso v. Pan Am. World Airways, Inc., 43 Cal. 3d 517, 520, 733 P.2d 614, 615,
235 Cal. Rptr. 292, 293 (1987).
5. Id. at 530, 733 P.2d at 622, 235 Cal. Rptr. at 300.
6. See id. at 520, 533, 733 P.2d at 615, 624, 235 Cal. Rptr. at 293, 302.
7. See infra notes 92-122 and accompanying text (discussion of RLA preemption).
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the National Labor Relations Act (NLRA),8 the Labor Management
Relations Act (LMRA), 9 and the Federal Employers' Liability Act
(FELA) 10 in terms of labor law preemption." Part II of this Note

will summarize the facts of DeTomaso'2 and review the opinion."
Finally, part III of this Note will explore the possible legal ramifi4
cations of the decision in DeTomaso.1
I.
A.

LEGAL BACKGROUND

Labor Law Preemption

The doctrine of federal preemption of state law originates from
the supremacy clause of the United States Constitution. 5 Preemption

occurs When Congress manifests an intent to displace state law. 6
Congress may preempt state law by express terms.' 7 Alternatively,

congressional intent to preempt state law may be inferred when
federal regulation is sufficiently comprehensive to eliminate the possibility of any state regulation.' 8 In areas that Congress has not

8. National Labor Relations Act, Pub. L. No. 74-198, 49 Stat. 449 (1935) (codified as
amended at 29 U.S.C. §§ 151-169 (1982 & Supp. I1 1985)). See infra notes 28-46 and
accompanying text (discussion of NLRA preemption).
9. Labor Management Relations Act, Pub. L. No. 80-101, 61 Stat. 136 (1947) (codified
as amended at 29 U.S.C. §§ 141-197 (1982 & Supp. III 1985)). See infra notes 47-63 and
accompanying text (discussion of LMRA preemption).
10. Federal Employers' Liability Act, Pub. L. No. 60-100, 35 Stat. 65 (1908) (codified
as amended at 45 U.S.C. §§ 51-60 (1982 & Supp. HI 1985)). See infra notes 125-51 and
accompanying text (discussion of FELA claims).
11. See infra notes 15-24 and accompanying text (discussion of labor law preemption).
12. See infra notes 155-85 and accompanying text (discussion of the facts in DeTomaso).
13. See infra notes 186-94 and accompanying text (discussion of the opinion in DeTomaso).
14. See infra notes 195-227 and accompanying text (discussion of the legal ramifications
of the decision in DeTomaso).
15. U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2. Clause 2 provides, in pertinent part: "[The United States]
Constitution, and the laws of the United States which shall be made in Pursuance thereof...
shall be the supreme Law of the Land; and the Judges in every State shall be bound thereby,
any Thing in the Constitution or Laws of any State to the Contrary notwithstanding." Id.
See also Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1, 239-40 (1824) (Congressional power to
regulate interstate commerce preempted the right of New York to issue exclusive ferry
franchises, although the term "preemption" was never used).
16. See California Sav. & Loan Ass'n v. Guerra, 55 U.S.L.W. 4077, 4079 (U.S. January
13, 1987) (No. 85-494). Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as amended by the Pregnancy
Discrimination Act of 1978, did not preempt section 12954(b)(2) of the California Government
Code because the state statute was not inconsistent with the purposes of the federal act and
did not require the doing of an unlawful act under Title VII. Id, at 4080, 4083. See infra
notes 19-21 and accompanying text (discussion of conflict preemption).
17. Jones v. Rath Packing Co., 430 U.S. 519, 525 (1977). Section 408 of the Federal
Meat Inspection Act expressly preempted section 12211 of the California Business and Professions Code and Article 5 of Title 4 of the California Administrative Code. Id. at 530-32.
18. Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator Corp., 331 U.S. 218, 230 (1947). The 1931 amendments to
the United States Warehouse Act preempted an Illinois public utilities statute, except to the
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completely displaced state regulation, federal law may nevertheless
preempt state law to the extent that there exists an actual conflict

between federal and state law. 19 In conflict preemption, compliance
with both federal and state regulations is physically impossible" or

state law prohibits the accomplishment of the objectives of Congress.2
The commerce clause 22 gives Congress the power to regulate labor
relations in industries affecting interstate commerce. 2 Congress exercised the power to regulate labor relations by enacting the Railway
Labor Act (RLA), the National Labor Relations Act (NLRA), the

Labor Management Relations Act (LMRA), and the Labor-Management Reporting and Disclosure (Landrum-Griff'm) Act (LMRDA). 24
A discussion of preemption under the NLRA,25 the LMRA,26 and the
RLA 27 follows.

extent that the federal statute failed to cover the field or provide express exceptions in favor
of state law. Id. at 234 & n.12, 235-37.
19. Guerra, 55 U.S.L.W. at 4080.
20. E.g., Florida Lime & Avocado Growers, Inc. v. Paul, 373 U.S. 132, 142-43 (1963).
Dual compliance with California law, certifying the maturity of avocados based upon oil
content, and federal regulations, certifying the maturity of avocados based upon picking date,
size, and weight, was not physically impossible. Id. at 133-34, 139, 143.
21. E.g., Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52, 67 (1941). The Pennsylvania Alien Registration
Act of 1939 stood as an obstacle to the accomplishment of the full objectives of Congress,
delineated in the Alien Registration Act of 1940. Id. at 72-74.
22. U.S. CoNsT. art. I, § 8, cl. 3. Clause 3 provides: "[Congress shall have the power]
To regulate Commerce with foreign Nations, and among the several States, and with the
Indian Tribes." Id.
23. NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. 1, 31 (1937). The United States
Supreme Court upheld the constitutional validity of the NLRA on the basis that the Act
protected interstate commerce by guaranteeing employees the rights of self-organization and
free choice in the designation of collective bargaining representatives. Id. at 41-42, 48. Under
the affectation doctrine, Congress may regulate any activity carried on in one state or several
which appreciably affects interstate commerce, directly or indirectly. Id. at 36-37. Congressional
power to regulate pursuant to the commerce clause is limited to an industry which exerts a
substantial economic effect on interstate commerce as determined by the aggregate effect of
all business activity within the industry. Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 111, 125, 127-29 (1942)
(the aggregate effect of wheat consumption by farmer growers constituted a substantial effect
on interstate commerce).
24. Labor-Management Reporting and Disclosure (Landrum-Griffm) Act, Pub. L. No.
86-257, 73 Stat. 519 (1959) (codified as amended at 29 U.S.C. §§ 153, 158-160, 164, 186, 187,
401-531 (1982 & Supp. 111 1985)). The LMRDA guarantees members of labor organizations
the rights of freedom of speech and assembly, nomination of candidates, voting in union
elections, attendance of union meetings, and participation in union deliberations. 29 U.S.C. §
411 (1959). The statute also requires unions, officers, employees, and others having certain
dealings with unions to report specified information to the Secretary of Labor. 29 U.S.C. §§
431-433 (1959). The LMRDA also establishes election procedures for union officers. 29 U.S.C.
2481
(1959).
25. See infra notes 28-46 and accompanying text (discussion of NLRA preemption).
26. See infra notes 47-63 and accompanying text (discussion of LMPA preemption).
27. See infra notes 92-122 and accompanying text (discussion of RLA preemption).
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B.

NLRA Preemption

The National Labor Relations Act (NLRA)28 guarantees employees
the rights of collective bargaining, 29 freedom of association, ° self-

organization, 3' and designation of representatives to negotiate the terms
and conditions of employment in industries affecting interstate commerce. 32 NLRA preemption occurs in two distinct situations. 3 In San
Diego Building Trades Council v. Garmon,34 the United States Supreme Court ruled that the National Labor Relations Board (NLRB)
possesses exclusive jurisdiction whenever a state attempts to regulate
conduct that is either arguably prohibited by section 811 of the NLRA
or arguably protected by section 736 of the NLRA. 37 Hence, a state
claim which is arguably governed by section 7 or section 8 of the
NLRA is preempted under the Garmon principle 38 with limited ex39
ceptions.
28. National Labor Relations Act, Pub. L. No. 74-198, 49 Stat. 449 (1935) (codified as
amended at 29 U.S.C. §§ 151-169 (1982 & Supp. III 1985)).
29. 29 U.S.C. § 151 (1935). Section 151 provides, in relevant part: "It is declared to be
the policy of the United States to eliminate the causes of certain substantial obstructions to
the free flow of commerce and to mitigate and eliminate these obstructions when they have
occurred by encouraging the practice and procedure of collective bargaining .... " Id,
(emphasis added).
30. Id. Section 151 provides, in relevant part: "It is declared to be the policy of the
United States to eliminate the causes of certain substantial obstructions to the free flow of
commerce and to mitigate and eliminate these obstructions when they have occurred ... by
protecting the exercise by workers of full freedom of association . .. ." Id. (emphasis added).
31. Id. Section 151 provides, in relevant part: "It is declared to be the policy of the
United States to eliminate the causes of certain substantial obstructions to the free flow of
commerce and to mitigate and eliminate these obstructions when they have occurred ... by
protecting the exercise by workers of . . . self-organization . . . ." Id. (emphasis added).
32. Id. Section 151 provides, in relevant part:
It is declared to be the policy of the United States to eliminate the causes of certain
substantial obstructions to the free flow of commerce and to mitigate and eliminate
these obstructions when they have occurred.., by protecting the exercise by workers
of ... designation of representatives of their own choosing, for the purpose of
negotiating the terms and conditions of their employment or other mutual aid or
protection.
Id. (emphasis added).
33. See generally Cox, Recent Developments in FederalLabor Law Preemption, 41 Omo
ST. L.J. 277, 277-78 (1980) (providing an exhaustive analysis of NLRA preemption).
34. 359 U.S. 236 (1959).
35. 29 U.S.C. § 158 (1959) (section 8 defines acts constituting unfair labor practices).
36. 29 U.S.C. § 157 (1959) (section 7 protects the rights of employees to self-organization
and collective bargaining).
37. San Diego Bldg. Trades Council v. Garmon, 359 U.S. 236, 245 (1959). The NLRA
preempted a state claim by an employer against a union for picketing which was arguably
governed by section 7 or section 8 of the NLRA. Id. at 246.
38. Id. at 245.
39. See, e.g., Farmer v. Local 25, United Bhd. of Carpenters, 430 U.S. 290, 295-303 &
n.11, 305-06 (1977) (a state tort claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress against a
union based on conduct constituting an unfair labor practice under sections 8(b)(1)(A) and
8(b)(2) of the NLRA is not Garmon preempted if the conduct is "outrageous"). See Infra
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A state claim based on conduct which is not arguably prohibited
or protected by the NLRA may nevertheless be preempted if the
application of state law would upset the balance of power 4° between
labor and management established by the NLRA. 41 Bargaining process
preemption 42 and bargaining agreement preemption43 represent two
theories which prevent upsetting the balance of power. 44 Bargaining
process preemption displaces state laws that affect parties presently
engaged in collective bargaining.45 Bargaining agreement preemption
rights and duties
overrides state regulation that interferes with the
46
of parties to a collective bargaining agreement.
notes 106-08 and accompanying text (further discussion of Farmer); Vaca v. Sipes, 386 U.S.
171, 176-88 (1967) (a claim for breach of the duty of fair representation against a union is
not Garmon preempted despite the fact that the conduct of the union constitutes an unfair
labor practice under section 8(b) of the NLRA); Smith v. Evening News Ass'n, 371 U.S. 195,
197-201 (1962) (a claim for breach of a collective bargaining agreement arising under section
301 of the LMRA based on wage discrimination constituting an unfair labor practice pursuant
to section 8(a)(3) of the NLRA is not Garmon preempted); United Auto. Workers v. Wisconsin
Employment Relations Bd., 351 U.S. 266, 270, 275 (1956) (the state of Wisconsin was granted
an injunction against violent union conduct amounting to an unfair labor practice under
section 8(b)(1) of the NLRA); United Constr. Workers v. Laburnum Constr. Corp., 347 U.S.
656, 658, 668-69 (1954) (an employer's state claim for damages against a labor union based
on conduct constituting an unfair labor practice under section 8(b)(1)(A) of the LMRA was
not preempted by the LMRA because the conduct involved intimidation and threats of violence).
See also Garmon, 359 U.S. at 247, 248 & n.6 (court distinguishes Laburnum).
40. Cox, Labor Law Preemption Revisted, 85 HAgv. L. REy. 1337, 1352-53 (1972). Federal
labor laws provides a framework within which employees can organize themselves and bargain
collectively with employers concerning the terms and conditions of employment. Id. The framework strikes a balance of protection, prohibition, and laissez faire which would be upset if a
state could enforce views concerning accommodation of the same interests. Id. at 1352. The legal
framework for self-organization and collective bargaining, established by the NLRA, determines
the extent to which the conduct of employers and unions should be regulated. Id. The freedom
to reject the terms of the collective bargaining agreement proposed by the other party implies
freedom to resort to economic pressures, such as lockouts, strikes, boycotts, and picketing. Id.
at 1353. State law that restricts the objectives for which economic pressure can be applied or the
forms of pressure which are permissible, pursuant to the NLRA, shifts the balance of power in
favor of management or the union. Id.
41. Cox, supra note 33, at 278 (an exhaustive analysis of NLRA preemption). 42. Comment, NLRA Preemption of State Wrongful Discharge Claims, 34 HAsmN-s L.J.
635, 644-47 (1983) (discussion of bargaining process preemption and bargaining agreement

preemption).
43. Ad.
44. See id.
45. Id. See also New York Tel. Co. v. New York State Dep't of Labor, 440 U.S. 519, 54046 (1979) (the NLRA did not preempt the unemployment insurance system in New York
authorizing the payment of unemployment benefits to striking employees); Lodge 25, Int'l Ass'n
of Machinists v. Wisconsin Employment Relations Comm'n, 427 U.S. 132, 133, 148-51 (1976)
(the NLRA preempts states from enjoining unions and their members from refusing to work
overtime pursuant to a union policy designed to put economic pressure on the employer in
collective bargaining negotiations); Local 20, Teamsters v. Morton, 377 U.S. 252, 256-61 (1964)
(section 303 of the LMRA preempts state claims for peaceful secondary picketing even if the
conduct on the part of the union is not arguably prohibited by section 8 of the NLRA or
arguably protected by section 7).
46. Comment, supra note 42, at 644. See also Malone v. White Motor Corp., 435 U.S.
497, 504-14 (1978) (the NLRA does not preempt state laws regulating pension plans that are the
subject of a collective bargaining agreement); Local 24, Int'l Bhd. of Teamsters v. Oliver, 358
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C. LMRA Preemption
Section 301 of the Labor Management Relations Act (LMRA)4 7

43
provides for the enforceability of collective bargaining agreements.

The parties may specify the particular methods of enforcing the
agreement, including conciliation, mediation, and arbitration. 49 Courts

construe arbitration clauses as requiring contracting parties to exhaust
contractual grievance and arbitration procedures prior to seeking
judicial redress, 50 unless arbitration is expressly designated as a nonexclusive remedy.51
Local 174, Teamsters v. Lucas Flour Co.5 2 is the first case to
analyze the preemptive effect of section 301.53 Lucas Flour held that
section 301 of the LMRA governs the resolution of labor contract
violations. 54 Section 301 preempts state laws which purport to define

the meaning or scope of a term in a labor contract.
Corp. v.

Lueck5 6

5

Allis-Chalmers

extended the preemption principle articulated in

57
Lucas Flour to include suits other than for breach of contract.
Under Allis-Chalmers, a state claim which is substantially dependent
upon the terms of a labor contract is treated as a section 301 claim
and preempted by federal labor-contract law.5 8 The Court reasoned

U.S. 283, 294 (1959) (sections 7 and 8 of the NLRA preempt state antitrust laws that prohibit
parties from exercising collective bargaining rights enumerated in a collective bargaining agreement).
47. Labor Management Relations Act, Pub. L. No. 80-101, 61 Stat. 136 (1947) (codified
as amended at 29 U.S.C. §§ 141-197 (1982 & Supp. III 1985)). Section 301 of the LMRA is
set forth at Title 29 of the United States Code section 185(a) (1947). Section 185(a) states, in
pertinent part: "Suits for violation of contracts between an employer and a labor organization
representing employees in an industry affecting commerce .. . may be brought in any district
court of the United States having jurisdiction of the parties." 29 U.S.C. § 185(a) (1947).
48. Textile Workers Union of Am. v. Lincoln Mills, 353 U.S. 448, 451, 454 (1957)
(statutory recognition of the collective bargaining agreement as an enforceable contract will
promote industrial peace by imposing a higher degree of responsibility upon the parties to the
agreement).
49. 29 U.S.C. § 171 (1947) (declaration of the purpose and policy of the NLRA).
50. Republic Steel v. Maddox, 379 U.S. 650, 652-53 (1965). The LMRA preempted
Maddox' claim for severance pay because Maddox failed to exhaust the grievance and
arbitration procedures enumerated in the collective bargaining agreement prior to instituting
the lawsuit. Id. at 659.
51. Id. at 657-59 (the parties did not expressly designate arbitration as a nonexclusive
remedy).
52. 369 U.S. 95 (1962).
53. Local 174, Teamsters v. Lucas Flour Co., 369 U.S. 95, 102 (1962) (section 301 of the
LMRA preempted a suit by an employer against a union for damages caused by a strike).
54. Id.
55. Id. at 103. The union expressly agreed in the collective bargaining agreement to settle
grievances pertaining to strikes by final and binding arbitration. Id. at 106.
56. 471 U.S. 202 (1985).
57. Allis-Chalmers Corp. v. Lueck, 471 U.S. 202, 212, 220 (1985). Allis-Chalmers involved
a tort claim for bad faith breach of contract. Id. at 206.
58. Id. at 212, 220. The United States Supreme Court expressly rejected the holding of
the Wisconsin Supreme Court that a claim for bad faith breach of contract is legally independent

910
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that where federal policy intends to provide a single remedy for a
collection of events, the plaintiff cannot circumvent that exclusive
remedy by relying on state law tort remedies. 9
The United States Supreme Court, in Caterpillar,Inc. v. Williams, 60
held that a suit for breach of an individual employment contract
which is independent of a subsequent collective bargaining agreement
is not preempted by section 301 . 61 According to Caterpillar,section
301 does not preempt a state claim that bears no relationship to a
collective bargaining agreement except that an individual covered by
the agreement asserts the claim.6 2 Accordingly, Caterpillarreaffirms
6
the preemption principle of Allis-Chalmers. 1

D. Scope of the RLA
Congress enacted the Railway Labor Act (RLA)64 in 1926 in an
attempt to stabilize industrial relations 65 and extend periods during

which disputes among employees, employers, and unions could be
resolved peacefully 6 In 1936, Congress extended the coverage of the
RLA beyond the railroad industry 7 to encompass the airline industry.6s The purposes of the RLA are to promote the free flow of
of a section 301 claim. Id. at 215-16. The Wisconsin Supreme Court suggested that a bad
faith tort claim could be unrelated to a section 301 contractual claim. Lueck v. Aetna Life
Ins. Co., 116 Wis. 2d 559, 566, 342 N.W.2d 699, 703 (1984). To illustrate, an insurer could
pay a claim as required under a contract but still cause injury through unreasonably delaying
payment. Id. at 574, 342 N.W.2d at 707. The United States Supreme Court indicated that the
distinction of the Wisconsin Supreme Court was based upon the fact that the implied duty to
act in good faith is different from the explicit contractual duty to pay. Allis-Chalmers, 471
U.S. at 216. The United States Supreme Court ruled that the extent of either duty ultimately
depends upon the terms of the contract which must be interptreted according to federal law.
Id. Moreover, if section 301 were not understood to preempt tort claims for bad faith breach
of contract, then the role of an arbitrator could be easily bypassed since nearly any alleged
willful breach of contract can be restated as a tort claim for bad faith breach of contract. Id.
at 219.
59. See Allis-Chalmers, 471 U.S. at 212, 220. Cf. San Diego Bldg. Trades Council v.
Garmon, 359 U.S. 236, 244-45 (1959) (allowing states to control conduct which is the subject
of national regulation would frustrate the purposes of federal law). See supra notes 34-39 and
accompanying text (discussion of Garmon preemption under the National Labor Relations Act
(NLRA)).
60. 55 U.S.L.W. 4804 (U.S. June 9, 1987) (No. 86-526).
61. Caterpillar, Inc. v. Williams, 55 U.S.L.W. 4804, 4806 (U.S. June 9, 1987) (No. 86-

526).
62. Id. at 4806 n.10. Williams' individual employment contract, giving rise to a state
claim, was separate and independent of the subsequent collective bargaining agreement. Id. at

4806.
63. Id. at 4806 & n.10.
64. Railway Labor Act, Pub. L. No. 69-257, 44 Stat. 577 (1926) (codified as amended at
45 U.S.C. §§ 151-188 (1982 & Supp. III 1985)).
65. 9 KHEEL, LABOR LAW (MB) § 50.02, at 50-4 (1986).
66. Id.
67. 45 U.S.C. § 151 (1926).
68. 45 U.S.C. § 181 (1936).
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interstate commerce, 69 to guarantee the rights of freedom of
association" and self-organization, 7 ' and to provide for the prompt
and orderly settlement of major 72 and minor disputes. 73 A "major
dispute" arises out of the formation or change of a collective
bargaining agreement covering rates of pay, rules, or working conditions . 74 A "minor dispute" arises out of grievances regarding the
interpretation or application of agreements concerning rates of pay,
75
rules, or working conditions.
A comparison of the purposes of the RLA, 76 the NLRA,7 7 and the
LMRA 78 indicates a relationship among the statutes. 79 The purposes

of the RLA are analogous to the purposes of the NLRA and LMRA.80
Only the LMRA analogue is implicated in DeTomaso v. Pan Amer69. 45 U.S.C. § 151(a)(1) (1926). Section 151(a)(1) provides: "[A purpose of the RLA is]
[t]o avoid any interruption to commerce or to the operation of any carrier engaged therein."

Id.
70. 45 U.S.C. § 151(a)(2) (1926). Section 151(a)(2) provides: "[A purpose of the RLA is]
to forbid any limitation upon the freedom of association among employees or any denial as
a condition of employment or otherwise, of the right of employees to join a labor organization."

Id.
71. 45 U.S.C. § 151(a)(3) (1926). Section 151(a)(3) provides: "[A purpose of the RLA is]
to provide for the complete independence of carriers and of employees in the matter of selforganization to carry out the purposes of this Act." Id.
72. See 45 U.S.C. § 151(a)(5) (1926). Section 151(a)(5) provides: "[A purpose of the RLA
is] to provide for the prompt and orderly settlement of all disputes growing out of grievances

or out of the interpretation or application of agreements covering rates of pay, rules, or
working conditions." Id. Section 151(a)(5) disputes have been termed "major disputes." See,
e.g., Detroit & T.S.L. R.R. v. United Transp. Union, 396 U.S. 142, 145 n.7 (1969). A union
proposal to amend the collective bargaining agreement invokes the "major dispute" settlement

procedures of the RLA. Id. at 145.
73. See 45 U.S.C. § 151(a)(4) (1926). Section 151(a)(4) provides: "[A purpose of the RLA
is] to provide for the prompt and orderly settlement of all disputes concerning rates of pay,
rules, or working conditions." Id. Section 151(a)(4) disputes have been termed "minor
disputes." See, e.g., Elgin, J. & E. R.R. v. Burley, 325 U.S. 711, 723 (1945) (defining the
term "minor dispute").
74. Detroit & T.S.L. R.R., 96 U.S. at 145 n.7.
75. Burley, 325 U.S. at 723.
76. 45 U.S.C. § 151(a) (1926) (purposes of the RLA). See supra text accompanying notes
69-73, 76-80 (discussion of the purposes of the RLA).
77. 29 U.S.C. § 151 (1935) (purposes of the NLRA). See supra, text accompanying notes
28-32 (discussion of the purposes of the NLRA).
78. 29 U.S.C. § 171(a) (1947) (purposes of the LMRA). See supra, text accompanying
notes 47-48 (discussion of the purpose of section 301 of the LMRA).
79. Compare Railway Labor Act, 45 U.S.C. § 151(a) (1926) (purposes of the RLA) with
National Labor Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. § 151 (1935) (purposes of the NLRA) and Labor
Management Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. § 171(a) (1947) (purposes of the LMRA).
80. Compare Railway Labor Act, 45 U.S.C. § 151(a)(2), (3) (1926) (guaranteeing the rights
of freedom of association and self-organization) with National Labor Relations Act, 29 U.S.C.
§ 151 (1935) (guaranteeing employees the right of collective bargaining, freedom of association,
self-organization, and designation of representatives to negotiate the terms and conditions of
employment whenever a denial would affect interstate commerce). Compare Railway Labor
Act, 45 U.S.C. § 151(a)(4), (5) (1926) (providing for the prompt and orderly settlement of
major and minor disputes) with Labor Management Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. § 171(a) (1947)
(providing for the enforceability of collective bargaining agreements).
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ican World Airways, Inc."'

The RLA requires any collective bargaining agreement reached
between an employer and a union to include detailed grievance and
arbitration procedures. 82 The grievance and arbitration procedures of

the RLA must be utilized to resolve "minor disputes. '

83

Minor

carrier.8 4

Either
disputes are to be settled on the property of the
85
party may take the matter before the Adjustment Board for resolution if a settlement cannot be reached.8
Awards of the Adjustment Board are final and binding upon both

parties to the dispute. 87 Finality of Adjustment Board decisions
promotes stability in the air and rail carrier industries.88 Consequently,
courts do not intervene into the area of minor disputes except to
determine the validity of an underlying contract, 89 to enforce an
Adjustment Board award, 90 or to provide limited judicial review. 9 1

81. Compare Labor Management Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. § 171(a) (1947) (purposes of
the LMRA) with DeTomaso v. Pan Am. World Airways, Inc., 43 Cal. 3d 517, 526-33, 733
P.2d 614, 618-24, 235 Cal. Rptr. 292, 296-302 (1987) (demonstrating that only the LMRA
analogue is implicated).
82. 45 U.S.C. §§ 151-188 (1926) (the RLA does not require the parties to be part of a
collective bargaining agreement, only that the parties bargain in good faith).
83. 45 U.S.C. § 153 (1926). Resolution of "major disputes" is governed by separate
grievance procedures. See 45 U.S.C. § 155 (1926).
84. 45 U.S.C. § 153 First (1926). "Carrier" refers to the airline or railroad employer.
See id. See also 45 U.S.C. § 151 First (1926) (defining rail "carrier"). See also 45 U.S.C. §
181 (1936) (extending the coverage of the RLA to include air carriers).
85. Id. (the statute establishes the National Railroad Adjustment Board (NRAB) as a
permanent national board for railroad labor disputes). No permanent national board has been
established for the airline industry. See 45 U.S.C. § 184 (1936) (the statute does not establish
a permanent national board). Instead, individual carriers and their employees are under a
statutory duty to establish system, group, or regional boards of adjustment. Id.
(1926) (describing the procedures for handling minor disputes).
86. 45 U.S.C. § 153 First (i)
87. 45 U.S.C. § 153 First (in) (1926) (describing the procedures concerning and the effects
resulting from awards by the Adjustment Board).
88. Union Pac. R.R. v. Sheehan, 439 U.S. 89, 94 (1978). The determination by the
Adjustment Board that Sheehan had not filed his appeal to the Board within the time
requirements of the collective bargaining agreement was final and binding upon the parties,
pursuant to section 153 First (q) of the RLA. Id. at 95.
89. See, e.g., Int'l Ass'n of Machinists v. Central Airlines Inc., 372 U.S. 682, 691, 695
(1963) (the enforceability of an Adjustment Board award required a determination of the
validity of a contract between an airline and a labor union pursuant to section 204 of the

RLA).
90. See, e.g., Bhd. of R.R. Trainmen v. Denver & R.G.W. R.R., 370 F.2d 833, 834, 836
(10th Cir. 1966) (remanding the case to the district court to enforce an award by the National
Railroad Adjustment Board (NRAB) pursuant to section 153 First of the RLA).
91. 45 U.S.C. § 153 First (q) (1926). Section 153 First (q) provides, in relevant part:
If any employee ... or any carrier ... is aggrieved by any of the terms of an
award [of any division of the Adjustment Board] ... then such employee ... or
carrier may file in any United States district court ... a petition for review of the
[division's] order ... On such review, the findings and order of the [division] shall
be conclusive on the parties, except that the order of the division may be set aside,
in whole or in part .... for failure of the [division] to comply with the requirements
of this chapter, for failure of the order to conform, or confine itself, to matters
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E.

RLA Preemption

Congress did not provide in express terms that the RLA preempts
state regulation. 92 Rather, RLA preemption evolved out of federal

case law, beginning with the decision of Andrews v. Louisville &
Nashville R.R. 93 In Andrews, the plaintiff brought an action against
his employer for wrongful discharge based on the refusal of his
employer to allow the plaintiff to return to work following recovery
from an injury. 94 The United States Supreme Court held that the
RLA preempted the wrongful discharge claim because the claim was
dependent upon an interpretation of a collective bargaining agreement. 95 The Supreme Court reasoned that the substance of the claim
was breach of an employment contract, 96 not a tortious discharge. 97

Under Andrews, a proper RLA preemption analysis examines the
substance, 9 not the characterization, 99 of a state claim. 1 0

Two different approaches exist for examining the substance of a

state claim to determine whether the claim constitutes a minor dispute
so as to be preempted by the RLA. 101 Magnuson v. Burlington

within the scope of the [division's] jurisdiction, or for fraud or corruption by a
member of the [division] making this order.
Id. See also, Andrews v. Louisville & N. R.R., 406 U.S. 320, 325 (1972) (in some situations,
the RLA makes the remedy for the resolution of minor disputes exclusive, rather than merely
requiring exhaustion of remedies in one forum before resorting to another).
92. See 45 U.S.C. §§ 151-188 (1945) (the statute does not mention preemption).
93. 406 U.S. 320 (1972).
94. Andrews, 406 U.S. at 320-21.
95. Id. at 324 (to determine whether the plaintiff was wrongfully discharged required an
interpretation of the collective bargaining agreement).
96. Id. at 323-24 (the employment contract was governed by a collective bargaining
agreement which specified mandatory grievance procedures for disputes concerning discharge).
97. Id. at 324 (a wrongful discharge implies a breach of a contractual standard).
98. Id. at 323-24. The "substance" of a claim is determined by the underlying facts, not
by the particular manner in which the plaintiff chooses to characterize those facts. See id.
99. Id. (the plaintiff characterized his claim as wrongful discharge instead of breach of
employment contract).
100. Id. (the United States Supreme Court refused to allow the plaintiff to characterize his
claim for breach of employment contract as a claim for wrongful discharge in order to avoid
RLA preemption). The distinction between substance and characterization ("substance/characterization distinction") has been followed for torts other than for wrongful discharge. See,
e.g., Magnuson v. Burlingtoli N., Inc., 576 F.2d 1367, 1368-69 (9th Cir. 1978) (involving the
torts of conspiracy and intentional infliction of emotional distress). See infra notes 102-09 and
accompanying text (discussion of the Magnuson rule). But see Raybourn v. Burlington N.
R.R., 602 F. Supp. 385, 387-88 (V.D. Mo. 1985) (involving the torts of false arrest and
imprisonment). See infra notes 110-12 and accompanying text (discussion of the Raybourn
rule).
101. See Magnuson v. Burlington N., Inc., 576 F.2d 1367, 1369 (9th Cir. 1978). See
Raybourn v. Burlington N. R.R., 602 F. Supp. 385, 387-88 (W.D. Mo. 1985). See infra notes
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Northern, Inc. 102 provides that claims based on a matrix of facts10 3

which are inextricably intertwined'04 with the grievance and arbitration

procedures of a collective bargaining agreement are preempted by

the RLA. 05 In Magnuson, the court observed that an exception to

102-09 and accompanying text (discussion of the Magnuson rule). See infra notes 110-12 and
accompanying text (discussion of the Raybourn rule). The question of whether the RLA
preempts state claims relating to major disputes never arises because major disputes do not
give rise to state claims.
102. Magnuson, 576 F.2d at 1367 (9th Cir. 1978). Magnuson, a train dispatcher, filed a
claim against his railroad employer and other railroad supervisors for intentional infliction of
emotional distress allegedly arising out of a conspiracy by the railroad to cover up its negligence
pertaining to a head-on train collision resulting in deaths and personal injuries. Id. at 1368.
Subsequent to the train collision, the railroad conducted an investigation and concluded that
Magnuson, who was on duty at the time of the collision, was responsible for the accident.
Id. Thereafter, Magnuson was discharged. Id. The court found that the gravamen of Magnuson's claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress constituted a minor dispute subject
to the exclusive jurisdiction of the RLA. Id. The court noted that Magnuson's alleged emotional

distress was an incident of the alleged wrongful discharge rather than the result of the alleged
conspiracy. Id. at 1369. The court refused to allow Magnuson to characterize the claim for
wrongful discharge as a claim for tortious conspiracy and intentional infliction of emotional
distress. Id. The recognition by the Magnuson court of the "substance/characterization
distinction" is a paradigm case of proper RLA preemption analysis under Andrews. See supra
text accompanying notes 93-100 (discussion of proper RLA preemption analysis under Andrews).
103. Magnuson, 576 F.2d at 1369 (a "matrix of facts" denotes the underlying set of facts
comprising the claim).
104. Id. "Inextricably intertwined" means 'closely related to' or 'governed by.' See id. at
1369-70 (the court defines "inextricably intertwined" as "arguably" governed by or has a
"not obviously insubstantial" relationship to).
105. Id. at 1369-70 (claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress inextricably
intertwined with the grievance and arbitration procedures of the collective bargaining agreement
and preempted by the RLA). See also Stephens v. Norfolk & W. Ry., 792 F.2d 576, 580 (6th
Cir. 1986) (claim for violation of the Michigan Handicapper's Civil Rights Act inextricably
intertwined with the collective bargaining agreement and preempted by the RLA). Id. at 581;
Jackson v. Consol. R.R. Corp., 717 F.2d 1045, 1053 (7th Cir. 1983) (claim for retaliatory
discharge inextricably intertwined with the collective bargaining agreement and preempted by
the RLA). See id. at 1054; Beers v. Southern Pac. Transp. Co., 703 F.2d 425, 428-29 (9th
Cir. 1983) (claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress constituted a minor dispute
within the exclusive province of the RLA). Id. at 429; Schroeder v. Trans World Airlines,
Inc., 702 F.2d 189, 192 (9th Cir. 1983) (state claim for wrongful demotion involved a minor
dispute preempted by the RLA); Gray v. Chessie Sys., 588 F. Supp. 1334, 1336 (D. Md. 1984)
(claim for intentional interference with contractual relations involved a minor dispute so as to
be preempted by the RLA). Id. at 1337; Schwadron v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 585 F.
Supp. 1371, 1373-74 (W.D. Pa. 1984) (claim for negligent misrepresentation inextricably
intertwined with the collective bargaining agreement and preempted by the RLA); See Spencer
v. Missouri Pac. R.R., 581 F. Supp. 1220, 1221 (E.D. Mo. 1984) (claim for conspiracy to
interfere with employment rights inextricably intertwined with the collective bargaining agreement and preempted by the RLA); Majors v. United States Air, Inc., 525 F. Supp. 853, 85657 (D. Md. 1981) (claims for false imprisonment and defamation inextricably intertwined with
the collective bargaining agreement and preempted by the RLA); Carson v. Southern Ry., 494
F. Supp. 1104, 1111 (D.S.C. 1979) (claim for defamation constituted a minor dispute within
the exclusive jurisdiction of the RLA Adjustment Board). Id. at 1112; Downing v. The
Travelers Ins. Co., 107 Idaho 511, 516-17, 691 P.2d 375, 380-81 (1984) (claim for death
benefits under an insurance policy inextricably intertwined with the collective bargaining
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federal labor law preemption had been announced in Farmer v. Local
25, United Brotherhood of Carpenters,1'1 which dealt with NLRA
preemption.3 0 The Farmer exception states that federal law does not
preempt claims based on conduct which is so outrageous that no
reasonable person in a civilized society should be expected to endure
the conduct. 08 Consequently, a state claim which is inextricably
intertwined with a collective bargaining agreement and based on
"outrageous" conduct is not preempted under the Magnuson rule. 0 9
In contrast, Raybourn v. Burlington Northern R.R." 0 states that the

RLA does not preempt state tort claims that are legally independent
of the collective bargaining agreement."' A legally independent state

agreement and preempted by the RLA); Burkin v. Burlington N. R.R., 690 S.W.2d 508 (1985)
(claims for emotional distress and wrongful discharge involved minor disputes so as to be
preempted by the RLA); Gonzalez v. Northwest Airlines, Inc., 201 N.J. Super. 422, 427-28,
493 A.2d 547, 550 (1985) (claim for wrongful discharge constituted a minor dispute subject to
the exclusive jurisdiction of the RLA).
106. 430 U.S. 290 (1977). An employee, Hill, alleged that union officials discriminated
against him in referrals for employment in violation of a collective bargaining agreement and
a membership contract. Id. at 292-93. In addition, Hill claimed that the officials had engaged
in outrageous conduct, threats, and intimidation, causing Hill to suffer grievious emotional
distress and physical injury. Id. The United States Supreme Court held that the NLRA did
not preempt Hill's state tort claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress even though
the conduct of the union could arguably be characterized as an unfair labor practice. Id. at
302. The Court emphasized, however, that Hill could not recover damages for the hiring
discrimination, but only for conduct unrelated to the discrimination such as the particularly
abusive manner in which the discrimination was implemented. Id. at 305. Under the Farmer
test, a state tort claim which does not arise out of the employment relation or is based on
"outrageous" conduct is not preempted by the NLRA. Id.
107. Magnuson v. Burlington N., Inc., 576 F.2d 1367, 1369 (9th Cir. 1978) (Farmercreated
a narrow exception to federal preemption). Magnuson recognized that Farmer, an NLRA
preemption case, has applicability in the context of RLA preemption. Id. However, the

plaintiff's claim did not fit within the Farmer exception. Id.
108. Farmer,430 U.S. at 302 (the abusive manner in which the union implemented hiring
discrimination against Hill constituted "outrageous" conduct). "Outrageous" conduct under
the Farmer exception may give rise to claims other than intentional infliction of emotional
distress. See, e.g., DeTomaso v. Pan Am. World Airways, Inc., 43 Cal. 3d 517, 531, 733
P.2d 614, 622, 235 Cal. Rptr. 292, 300 (1987) (outrageous conduct by an employer during the
course of a disciplinary investigation pursuant to the RLA may give rise to a state tort claim
of defamation). See infra notes 155-94 and accompanying text (discussion of the DeTomaso
case).
109. See Magnuson, 576 F.2d at 1369. The Magnuson rule is actually a reformulation of
the Farmer test. See supra text accompanying notes 106-08 (discussion of the Farmer test). If
a state tort claim does not arise out of the employment relation, then the claim is not
inextricably intertwined with the collective bargaining agreement and not preempted under the
Magnuson rule. See Magnuson, 576 F.2d at 1369. Additionally, a state tort claim based on
conduct which is inextricably intertwined with the collective bargaining agreement is not
preempted under the Magnuson rule if the conduct is "outrageous" as in Farmer. Id.
110. 602 F. Supp. 385 (W.D. Mo. 1985).
111. Id. at 387-88. Raybourn, a railroad employee, brought an action against his railroad
employer claiming false arrest and imprisonment. Id. at 386. When representatives of the
railroad found Raybourn sleeping in a caboose during working hours, they suspected Raybourn
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state interest and not interfere
tort claim must include a substantial
2
with the purposes of the RLA. 1
The Raybourn test and the Andrews test to determine legal independency are inconsistent.113 Under Andrews, a claim is legally independent of the collective bargaining agreement only when the

underlying facts do not give rise to a claim for breach of the collective
bargaining agreement.1 4 Andrews precludes a substantive claim for
breach of a collective bargaining agreement from being characterized
as a legally independent claim, such as tortious discharge.1 5 Thus,6 a

plaintiff may not escape RLA preemption by "artful pleading.""1

Under Raybourn, a "typical tort claim" is legally independent of
the collective bargaining agreement." 7 The court ruled the the plaintiff
to be intoxicated. Id. at 385-86. The representatives took Raybourn to a hospital for a blood
alcohol test. Id. at 386. Raybourn refused to take the test and alleged that the representatives
refused to let Raybourn speak with his lawyer or his wife who was a patient in the hospital.
Id. The representatives notified the police that Raybourn was under the influence of alcohol
and would possibly be driving home from the hospital. Id. The police subsequently arrested
Raybourn for disorderly conduct, which resulted in Raybourn spending five to six hours in
jail until he was released on bond. Id. Although the police dismissed the disorderly conduct
charge, the railroad terminated Raybourn from employment. Id. Raybourn appealed his
termination, pursuant to the grievance and arbitration procedures of a collective bargaining
agreement. Id. The termination was upheld on appeal. Id. Raybourn filed suit in state court
which was later removed to federal court. Id. The district court held that Raybourn's tort
claims for false arrest and imprisonment were legally independent of any contractual claim
for breach of the collective bargaining agreement. Id. at 387. Thus, the RLA did not preempt
Raybourn's tort claims. Id.
112. Id. at 388 (Missouri has a substantial state interest in protecting its citizens from false
arrest and imprisonment, and these tort claims will not interfere with the purposes of the
RLA).
113. Compare Raybourn v. Burlington N. R.R., 602 F. Supp. 385, 387-88 (W.D. Mo.
1985) (using the term "legally independent" claini) with Andrews v. Louisville & N. R.R.,
406 U.S. 320, 324 (1972) (using the term "sufficiently different" claim). The Magnuson court
did not formulate a test for legal independency. See Magnuson v. Burlington N., Inc., 576
F.2d 1367, 1369-70 (9th Cir. 1978). Instead, the court impliedly adopted the Andrews test for
legal independency when the court applied the Andrews "substance/characterization distinction." See id. at 1369 (Magnuson was precluded from characterizing his substantive claim for
wrongful discharge as a claim for tortious conspiracy and intentional infliction of emotional
distress). See supra text accompanying notes 98-100, 102 (discussion of the Andrews "substance/
characterization distinction").
114. See Andrews, 405 U.S. at 324.
115. Id. at 323-24. See also Magnuson, 576 F.2d at 1369 (the substance is determined by

whether the claim arises out of a matrix of facts which are inextricably intertwined with the
grievance and arbitration procedures of a federal collective bargaining agreement). See supra
text accompanying notes 98-100, 102 (discussion of the "substance/characterization distinction"
concerning RLA claims). Cf. Allis-Chalmers Corp. v. Lueck, 471 U.S. 202, 215-16 (1985) (a
claim for bad faith breach of contract is not legally independent of a LMRA section 301
contractual claim). See supra note 58 and accompanying text (discussion of legal independency
concerning claims relating to section 301 of the LMRA).
116. Magnuson, 576 F.2d at 1369 (artfully pleading a substantive claim for wrongful
discharge as a claim for tortious conspiracy and intentional infliction of emotional distress did
not prevent the claim from being preempted by the RLA).
117. Raybourn, 602 F. Supp. at 387 (providing no explanation of what constitutes a
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was not required to pursue his arbitrable claim for wrongful discharge. 18 Moreover, the court held that the RLA did not preempt
Raybourn's tort claims for false arrest and imprisonment despite the
fact that the claims were factually related to his claim for breach of
contract." 9 The court in Raybourn emphasized that the plaintiff did
not simply recharacterize claims arising from a discharge. 20 In addition, the court implied that the conduct of the railroad was outrageous and thus within the Farmer exception.' In DeTomaso, the
court posited that the Raybourn court incorrectly focused on the

characterization, as opposed to the substance, of the claim contrary
to Andrews.'2

This Note will return to an analysis of the inconsistency between
Raybourn and Andrews subsequent to a discussion of the DeTomaso
case. 23 A discussion of the relationship between FELA claims and
RLA preemption follows. 24 FELA cases will be presented and then
analyzed under the Magnuson rule.
F.

FELA Claims

The Federal Employers' Liability Act (FELA)2 - creates a tort
remedy for railroad workers who suffer personal injuries as a result
of the negligence of their employer or fellow employees.

son, Topeka and Santa Fe Ry. v. Buell,

27 the

26

In Atchi-

United States Supreme

"typical tort" other than declaring Raybourn's claims for false arrest and imprisonment as
typical torts).
118. Id.
119. Id. Raybourn's wrongful discharge claim was a claim for breach of the collective
bargaining agreement. See id.
120. Id.
121. See id. at 388 (the court never makes direct reference to Farmer). The court does
discuss outrageous conduct under the decision in Majors v. United States Air, Inc., 525 F.
Supp. 853 (D. Md. 1981). Id. at 387-88. However, the Majors court held that the claims of
the plaintiff were inextricably intertwined with a collective bargaining agreement and preempted
under the Magnuson rule. Majors, 525 F. Supp. at 856-57.
122. DeTomaso v. Pan Am. World Airways, Inc., 43 Cal. 3d 517, 529-30, 733 P.2d 614,
621, 235 Cal. Rptr. 292, 299 (1987). See infra note 199 and accompanying text (discussion by
the DeTomaso court regarding the focus of the Raybourn court).
123. See infra notes 201-15 and accompanying text (discussion of the inconsistency between
Raybourn and Andrews).
124. See infra notes 125-51 and accompanying text (discussion of FELA claims in relation
to RLA preemption).
125. Federal Employers' Liability Act, Pub. L. No. 60-100, 35 Stat. 65 (1908) (codified
as amended at 45 U.S.C. §§ 51-60 (1982 & Supp. III 1985)). Section 51 provides, in pertinent
part: "Every common carrier by railroad while engaging in commerce between any of the
several States or Territories ... shall be liable in damages to any person suffering injury while
he is employed by such carrier in such commerce .... ." 45 U.S.C. § 51 (1908).
126. Atchison, T. & S.F. Ry. v. Buell, 107 S. Ct. 1410, 1413 (1987).
127. Id. at 1410.

918
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Court held that the RLA does not preclude a FELA claim for
damages merely because the conduct causing the injury is possibly
subject to RLA arbitration. 12 The FELA provides substantive protection against conduct that is independent of the obligations of an
employer under the collective bargaining agreement. 129 In addition,
the Act provides recovery of money damages,130 unlike the limited
relief of back pay and reinstatement that is available through RLA
arbitration. 3 ' Buell is consistent with the Magnuson rule 32 because
the FELA claim for tortious physical injury was not inextricably

intertwined with the collective bargaining agreement.'
In Balzeit v. Southern Pacific Transportation Co., 3 Balzeit brought
an action for infliction of emotional distress. 35 Baizeit alleged that
his employer attempted to prevent him from continuing to retain
36
legal counsel in pursuit of a FELA claim against his employer.
The court characterized the attempt of the employer to deny Balzeit
his fundamental right to counsel as outrageous conduct within the
Farmer exception. 37 Utilizing the Farmer exception was unnecessary
because the court ruled that the claim for infliction of emotional
distress did not flow from the employer's alleged wrongful refusal
to reinstate. 38 Instead, the claim arose from the employer's alleged
attempt to prevent Balzeit from continuing to retain legal counsel in
pursuit of the FELA claim. 39 Consequently, Balzeit's state tort claim
was not inextricably intertwined with the collective bargaining agree40
ment and hence not preempted under the Magnuson rule.
In Lewy v. Southern Pacific Transportation Co. ,41 the court held
that the RLA preempted a claim for retaliatory discharge. 42 The
128. Id. at 1415. The RLA has no effect upon a worker's right to collect damages under
the FELA. Id. at 1417.
129. Id.at 1415.
130. 45 U.S.C. § 51 (1908).
131. Buell, 107 S. Ct. at 1415 & n.12.
132. See supra text accompanying notes 102-09 (discussion of the Magnuson rule).
133. See Buell, 107 S. Ct. at 1415-16. See also Magnuson v. Burlington N., Inc., 576 F.2d
1367, 1369 (9th Cir. 1978) (claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress inextricably
intertwined with the grievance and arbitration procedures of the collective bargaining agreement).
134. 569 F. Supp. 986 (N.D. Cal. 1983).
135. Id. at 990 (the opinion does not specify whether the infliction of emotional distress
was intentional or negligent).
136. Id.
137. Id. at 989.
138. Id. at 990.
139. Id.
140. See Magnuson v. Burlington N., Inc., 576 F.2d 1367, 1369 (9th Cir. 1978) (claim for
intentional infliction of emotional distress inextricably intertwined with the grievance and
arbitration procedures of the collective bargaining agreement).
141. 799 F.2d 1281 (9th Cir. 1986).
142. Id. at 1292 (Lewy alleged that the discharge was in retaliation to his initiation of a
FELA action against his employer).
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court reasoned that two significant policies underlying the RLA
prevented Lewy from characterizing his claim for breach of the
collective bargaining agreement as a tortious discharge. 143 First, permitting the state claim would circumvent the policy that railroad
labor disputes should be resolved through grievance and arbitration
procedures rather than by litigation. 144 Second, recovery for emotional
injuries resulting from wrongful discharge is contrary to the RLA
policy of limiting employee remedies to reinstatement and back pay.145
The Lewy decision is consistent with the Magnuson rule because a.
retaliatory discharge claim is inextricably intertwined with the grievance and arbitration procedures of the collective bargaining agreement.Y6
In Pikop v. Burlington Northern R.R., 147 the plaintiff brought a
claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress against the
railroad. 148 Pikop alleged that she was sexually assualted by her
supervisor and continually harassed by her employees. 49 The court
found that the continual pattern of harassment constituted outrageous
conduct under the Farmer exception.150 Therefore, the court concluded that neither the RLA nor the FELA preempted Pikop's claim
for intentional infliction of emotional distress. 51
A unified analysis of RLA preemption appears in the decision of
DeTomaso v. Pan American World Airways, Inc. 15 2 The facts and

143.
144.
145.

Id. at 1290-91.
Id. at 1290.
Id. at 1291.

146.

See id. at 1290-91. To determine whether a retaliatory discharge is wrongful or tortious

requires an interpretation of the terms of the collective bargaining agreement. See Magnuson
v. Burlington N., Inc., 576 F.2d 1367, 1369 (9th Cir. 1978) (claims for wrongful discharge are

inextricably intertwined with the grievance and arbitration procedures of the collective bargaining agreement).
147. 390 N.W.2d 743 (Minn. 1986).

148. Id. at 744. Pikop, a seasonal-crew worker for the railroad, alleged that her supervisor
sexually assaulted her on several occasions, despite her complaints to railroad officials. Id. at
745. In addition, Pikop alleged that she was subject to continual harassment by co-employees,
who repeatedly called her "pig," "bitch," and "cunt" and repeatedly assaulted her. Id.

Furthermore, Pikop alleged that certain co-employees constantly threatened her with rat
carcasses and repeatedly forced her to watch or participate in the mutilation and torture of

rats and birds. Id. Finally, Pikop alleged that railroad supervisors allowed this conduct on the
part of her co-employees to take place repeatedly. Id.
149. Id.
150. Id. at 750, 752-53. Pikop illustrates that Farmer has applicability in the context of
the FELA as well as in the contexts of the NLRA, the LMRA, and the RLA.

151.

Id. at 744-45, 753.

152.

DeTomaso v. Pan Am. World Airways, Inc., 43 Cal. 3d 517, 526-33, 733 P.2d 614,
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opinion in DeTomaso are presented below. 5 3 Thereafter, this Note
rules in connection with
will reexamine the Magnuson and Raybourn
54
the legal ramifications of DeTomaso.
II.
A.

T11E CASE

The Facts
John DeTomaso worked in the cargo department of Pan American

World Airways, Inc. (Pan Am).-' On September 19, 1978, DeTomaso
purchased two bins of cargo from his supervisor. 5 6 Both DeTomaso
1 57
and his supervisor believed that the bins were abandoned cargo.

One of the bins contained batteries which DeTomaso attempted to
sell to Texas Instruments.15 DeTomaso was unaware that the batteries
were cargo to be transferred to Continental Airlines (Continental). 59
After Continental noted similar batteries as a delinquent shipment,
Texas Instruments notified Continental of DeTomaso's offer. 160 Pan

Am agents questioned DeTomaso regarding the purchase and determined that the batteries in DeTomaso's possession were part of Pan
Am's recent shipments. 161 One of the Pan Am agents made a state-

ment to DeTomaso which DeTomaso's son interpreted as an accusation of theft. 62 At trial, a psychiatrist whom DeTomaso consulted
to
in 1980 testified that the conduct of Pan Am caused 1DeTomaso
63
experience physical pain, appendicitis, and depression.

619-24, 235 Cal. Rptr. 292, 297-302 (1987) (analyzing RLA preemption in terms of case law
from Andrews v. Louisville & Nashville R.R. to Magnuson v. Burlington Northern, Inc. and
Raybourn v. Burlington Northern Ry., including references to cases governed by the National
Labor Relations Act (NLRA), Labor Management Relations Act (LMRA) and the Federal
Employers' Liability Act (FELA)).
153. See infra notes 155-85 and accompanying text (discussion of the facts in DeTomaso).
See infra notes 186-94 and accompanying text (discussion of the opinion in DeTomaso).
154. See infra notes 195-227 and accompanying text (discussion of the legal ramifications
of the decision in DeTomaso).
155. DeTomaso, 43 Cal. 3d at 520, 733 P.2d at 615, 235 Cal. Rptr. at 293.
156. Id.
157. Id.
158. Id. at 521, 733 P.2d at 615, 235 Cal. Rptr. at 293.
159. Id.
160. Id., 733 P.2d at 615-16, 235 Cal. Rptr. at 293-94.
161. Id., 733 P.2d at 616, 235 Cal. Rptr. at 294 (the determination was made from
identifiable air waybill numbers on the battery cartons).
162. Id. (the statements were made during the course of the investigation).
163. Id. at 522, 733 P.2d at 616, 235 Cal. Rptr. at 294 (in November of 1987, DeTomaso
experienced pain which culminated in the removal of his appendix and a growth on his
intestine). Thereafter, DeTomaso experienced continual depression and physical discomfort.
Id.
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The Teamsters Union, Local 2707 represented all employees in the
cargo department of Pan Am.' 4 The union and Pan Am were parties
to a collective bargaining agreement (the agreement), which specified
formal RLA procedures for disciplining or discharging airline employees. 6 Employees could not be disciplined or discharged without
an investigation by an airline official.1 66 In addition, employees who
believed they were treated unjustly could present a grievance. 167
During further investigation of DeTomaso, Pan Am officials informed a local union representative that Pan Am was considering
discharging DeTomaso on grounds of theft. 63 On January 11, 1979,
Pan Am discharged DeTomaso for fraud, dishonesty, and abuse of
company policy. 169 DeTomaso immediately filed a grievance claiming

that his termination violated the agreement. 70 A hearing resulted in
a denial of the grievance on the ground that DeTomaso's actions
violated the employee rules of conduct.17' On March 9, 1979, DeTomaso appealed 72 to the Western Regional Field Board of Adjustment. 173 On appeal, a settlement was reached which reinstated
DeTomaso with back pay, retroactive seniority, and benefits in
74
exchange for DeTomaso's withdrawal of the grievance.
Prior to his discharge, DeTomaso brought an action against Pan
Am in state court for damages claiming breach of warranty of title,
negligent and intentional infliction of emotional distress, and defamation. 75 In an amended complaint, DeTomaso deleted the claim
for negligent infliction of emotional distress. 76 A divided jury awarded
DeTomaso $265,000 in general damages and $300,000 in punitive
damages, without allocating the award between the tort and warranty

164. Id.
165. Id.

166.
167.
168.

Id.
Id.
Id. at 522-23, 733 P.2d at 616-17, 235 Cal. Rptr. at 294-95 (Pan Am notified the

local union representative pursuant to the agreement).
169.
170.
171.

Id. at 523, 733 P.2d at 617, 235 Cal. Rptr. at 295.
Id.
Id.

172.

Id. (DeTomaso appealed pursuant to the agreement).

173. Id. See supra text accompanying note 85 (the Western Regional Field Board of
Adjustment is an entity established pursuant to Title 45 of the United States Code section 184

for the purpose of resolving employment disputes in the airline industry).
174. DeTomaso, 43 Cal. 3d at 523, 733 P.2d at 617, 235 Cal. Rptr. at 295.
175. Id. (the claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress was based on the allegation
that Pan Am had wrongfully terminated DeTomaso and falsely accused DeTomaso of fraud).
176. Id.
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claims. 177 Pan Am moved for judgment notwithstanding the verdict
or, in the alternative, for a new trial or a remittitur. 178 The trial
court granted the motion for a new trial on the limited issue of
damages, subject to the condition that if DeTomaso would agree to
accept a remittitur by a reduction of $358,393, then the motion would
17 9
be denied.
DeTomaso refused the remittitur and appealed the granting of a
new trial by the lower court. 80 The basis of the appeal was that the
trial court failed to specify the grounds upon which it granted the

motion for new trial 8 ' in violation section 657 of the Code of Civil
Procedure.18 2 Pan Am cross-appealed asserting that the RLA pre-

empted DeTomaso's state tort claims. 83 The Court of Appeal reinstated the judgment as the trial court had failed to comply with

Code of Civil Procedure section 657.1 84 Pan Am appealed to the
California Supreme Court on the issue of preemption.
B.

85

The Opinion

The California Supreme Court asserted that the policies underlying
the RLA require that RLA preemption not be limited to suits alleging

contract violations. 8 6 Moreover, the court stated that allowing an
employee to institute a civil action by litigating the questions at issue

in arbitration would undermine the value of arbitration as a dispute
resolution tool. 8 7 The court held that the RLA preempts state claims
based on facts which are related to matters expressly or impliedly

governed by the collective bargaining agreement.' 8 However, the

177. Id. at 524, 733 P.2d at 617, 235 Cal. Rptr. at 295.
178. Id.
179. Id.
180. Id., 733 P.2d at 617, 235 Cal. Rptr. at 295-96.
181. Id. at 524 & n.6, 733. P.2d at 617 & n.6, 235 Cal. Rptr. at 295-96 & n.6.
182. CAL. Cv. PRoC. CODE § 657 (West 1976). Section 657 provides in pertinent part:
"When a new trial is granted, on all or part of the issues, the court shall specify the ground
or grounds upon which it is granted and the court's reason or reasons for granting the new
trial upon each ground stated." Id.
183. DeTomaso, 43 Cal. 3d at 524, 733 P.2d at 618, 235 Cal. Rptr. at 296.
184. Id.
185. Id.
186. Id. at 528, 733 P.2d at 620, 235 Cal. Rptr. at 298 (noting the consistency with the
United States Supreme Court in Allis-Chalmers that LMRA preemption not be limited to suits
for breach of contract). Allis-Chalmers extended the preemption principle articulated in Lucas
Flour to include suits other than breach of contract. See supra text accompanying notes 5259 (discussion of Allis-Chalmers and Lucas Flour).
187. Id. 733 P.2d at 620-21, 235 Cal. Rptr. at 298-99.
188. Id. at 529, 733 P.2d at 621, 235 Cal. Rptr. at 289-99. The first step of the DeTomaso
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court recognized an exception to conduct which so far exceeds the

scope of reasonableness that reference to the collective bargaining
agreement is unnecessary to resolve the claim. 189
The court found that the allegedly defamatory statements' 90 by Pan

Am agents occurred during the course of an investigation mandated
by the collective bargaining agreement. 19' Furthermore, the court

decided that the conduct during the investigation was governed by
the agreement. 9 2 According to the court, the abuses alleged by
DeTomaso were remediable, if at all, only through the grievance and

arbitration provisions of the collective bargaining agreement. 9 The
court concluded that a judicial determination of the reasonableness
of the required investigation would undermine the exclusiveness of
the grievance and arbitration procedures.
III.

94

LEGAL RAMIFICATIONS

In adopting the Magnuson rule' 95 with the Farmer exception 9 6 and
rejecting the Raybourn rule, l 9 the California Supreme Court resolved

preemption test is the Magnuson rule, whether the claim is inextricably intertwined with the
grievance and arbitration procedures of the collective bargaining agreement. Id. at 527-28, 733
P.2d at 620, 235 Cal. Rptr. at 298.
189. Id. at 529, 733 P.2d at 621, 235 Cal. Rptr. at 299. The second step of the test is the
Farmer exception, whether the employer's conduct is "outrageous." Id. at 531, 733 P.2d at
622-23, 235 Cal. Rptr. at 300-01.
190. DeTomaso, 43 Cal. 3d at 530, 733 P.2d at 622, 235 Cal. Rptr. at 300 (the allegedly
defamatory statements were made in the presence of DeTomaso's family and to a local union
representative). The statements suggested that DeTomaso was a thief. Id. at 521 & n.5, 733
P.2d at 616 & n.5, 235 Cal. Rptr. at 294 & n.5.
191. Id. at 530, 733 P.2d at 622, 235 Cal. Rptr, at 300. The court not only found that
the RLA preempted the defamation claim, but also that the allegedly defamatory statements
were privileged under California Civil Code section 47 and hence could not be considered
defamatory. Id. California Civil Code section 47 states, in relevant part: "A privileged
publication or broadcast is one made ... [i]n any (1) legislative or (2) judicial proceeding, or
(3) in any other official proceeding authorized by law, or (4) in the initiation or course of any
other proceeding authorized by law and reviewable pursuant to Chapter 2 (commencing with
Section 1084) of Title 1 of Part 3 of the Code of Civil Procedure." CAL. Cry. CODE § 47
(Vest 1982).
192. DeTomaso, 43 Cal. 3d at 530, 733 P.2d at 622, 235 Cal. Rptr. at 300.
193. Id.
194. Id. Congress expressly approved contract grievance procedures as a preferred method
for settling disputes. Republic Steel v. Maddox, 379 U.S. 650, 653 (1965). If a grievance
procedure cannot be made final, then the procedure loses much of its desirability as a method
of settlement. Id. A rule creating nonexclusive grievance procedures would inevitably exert a
disruptive influence upon both the negotiation and administration of collective bargaining
agreements. Teamsters Local v. Lucas Flour Co., 369 U.S. 95, 103 (1962).
195. Magnuson v. Burlington N., Inc., 576 F.2d 1367, 1369 (9th Cir. 1978) (the RLA
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a conflict among the California Courts of Appeal as to when the
RLA preempts state tort claims.' 98 More importantly, DeTomaso
exposes the deficiencies of the Raybourn rule 99 and clarifies analysis
of RLA preemption. 200 The Raybourn rule is inconsistent with Andrews and Allis-Chalmers (LMRA) in terms of legal independency
and the "substance/characterization distinction. ' 201 The Raybourn
rule ignores the substance of a state claim and instead focuses on
whether the claim is legally independent of the collective bargaining
agreement. 202 In contrast, Andrews requires an examination of the
substance, as opposed to the characterization, of a state claim for
20 1
purposes of RLA preemption analysis.

preempts state tort claims which are inextricably intertwined with the grievance and arbitration
procedures of the collective bargaining agreement).
196. Farmer v. Local 25, United Bhd. of Carpenters, 430 U.S. 290, 302 (1977) (the RLA
does not preempt state tort claims based on outrageous conduct).
197. Raybourn v. Burlington N. R.R., 602 F. Supp. 385, 387-88 (W.D. Mo. 1985) (the
RLA does not preempt state tort claims which are legally independent of the collective
bargaining agreement, provided there exists a substantial state interest and the claim will not
interfere with the purpose of the RLA).
198. DeTomaso v. Pan Am. World Airways, Inc., 43 Cal. 3d 517, 520, 733 P.2d at 614,
615, 235 Cal. Rptr. at 202, 293 (1987). See supra text accompanying notes 188-89 (discussing

the relationship between the DeTomaso test and both the Magnuson rule and the Farmer
exception). Compare Miller v. United Airlines, Inc., 174 Cal. App. 3d 878, 889, 220 Cal.
Rptr. 684, 691 (1985) (following Magnuson) with DeTomaso v. Pan Am. World Airways,
Inc., 184 Cal. App. 3d 344, 352, 354, 220 Cal. Rptr. 493, 498-500 (1985) (following Raybourn).
199. DeTomaso, 43 Cal. 3d at 529-30, 633 P.2d at 621, 235 Cal. Rptr. at 299. The
DeTomaso court asserted:
[T]he [Raybourn] court failed to follow the dictates of Andrews ... and Magnuson
... and did not analyze the substance of the claim, rather than its terminology, to
determine whether it was in fact premised on the collective bargaining agreement or
inextricably intertwined with its grievance machinery. Instead, the court simply stated,
in a conclusory fashion, that since the employee's claim was a "typical tort claim,"
it was not preempted.
Id. (citations omitted).
200. See id. (by analyzing the Raybourn rule in terms of the Andrews "substance/
characterization distinction" and legal independency test).
201. See supra text accompanying notes 113-22 (discussion of the inconsistency between
Raybourn and Andrews in terms of legal independency and the "substance/characterization
distinction" concerning RLA claims). See supra text accompanying note 58 (discussion of legal
independency concerning claims relating to section 301 of the LMRA).
202. See Raybourn v. Burlington N. R.R., 602 F. Supp. 385, 387 (1985) ("typical tort
claims" are not preempted by the RLA notwithstanding that they are factually related to a
claim for breach of the collective bargaining agreement). See supra text accompanying notes
110-13, 117-22 (discussion of Raybourn).
203. See Andrews v. Louisville & N. R.R., 406 U.S. 320, 323-24 (1972). See supra text
accompanyifig notes 93-100, 114-15, 120 (discussion of the "substance/characterization distinction" and legal independency test of Andrews). See also, Allis-Chalmers Corp. v. Lueck,
471 U.S. 202, 215-16 (1985) (refusing to characterize a section 301 LMRA claim for breach
of a collective bargaining agreement as a bad faith breach of contract).
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The inconsistency in the Raybourn and Andrews tests for legal

independency stems from the permissible relationship between the
underlying facts and the state claim. 204 In applying the Andrews test,

legal independency is determined by the factual composition of the
claim.205 Under the Andrews test, a claim is legally independent from

federal remedies only when the facts do not give rise to a claim for
breach of the collective bargaining agreement.06 Thus, if the facts
give rise to both a breach of the collective bargaining agreement and
to some other state claim, the state claim is preempted under Andrews.2 w On the other hand, in applying the Raybourn test, legal

independency is determined by the relationship between the legal
composition of the state tort claim and the claim for breach of the
collective bargaining agreement. 208 The Raybourn test focuses on
whether the essential legal elements of the two claims are distinct

without considering the factual composition of each claim or the
factual relationship between the claims.2 Consequently, the Raybourn court deems "typical tort claims" sufficiently distinct from
breach of contract claims regardless of whether the claims are factually related.

10

A state tort claim and a claim for breach of the collective bargaining agreement may be factually related without being composed
of identical facts. 211 If the set of facts common to both claims is

204. See supra text accompanying note 114 (discussion legal independency under Andrews).
See supra text accompanying notes 110-12, 117 (discussion of legal independency under
Raybourn).
205. See Andrews, 406 U.S. at 324 (the factual composition consists of the underlying set
of facts giving rise to the claim). See also Magnuson v. Burlington N., Inc. 576 F.2d 1367,
1369 (9th Cir. 1978) (claims based on a matrix of facts which are inextricably intertwined with
the grievance and arbitration procedures of the collective bargaining agreement are preempted
by the RLA). The Magnuson rule determines whether a claim is inextricably intertwined with
the collective bargaining agreement based on the factual composition of the claim. See id. See
supra text accompanying notes 102-09, 113 (discussion of the Magnuson rule).
206. See Andrews, 406 U.S. at 324.
207. See id.
208. See Raybourn v. Burlington N. R.R., 602 F. Supp. 385, 387 (1985) (the legal
composition consists of the essential legal elements of the claim).
209. See id. Factual relationship differs from factual composition in the sense that two
claims may be factually related (i.e., share common facts) without being composed of identical

facts. See, e.g., Raybourn, 602 F. Supp. at 387 (Rayboum's state tort claims for false arrest

and imprisonment were factually related to his breach of contract claim based on wrongful
discharge, but the claims did not share identical facts).
210. Raybourn, 602 F. Supp. at 387. The Raybourn court stated: "While the plaintiff's
breach of contract claim may be factually related, and must be processed in another manner,
it is sophistry to contend this typical tort claim is covered by, or precluded by, the Railway
Labor Act." Id.
211. See supra text accompanying note 209 (distinguishing factual relationship from factual
composition).
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sufficient to give rise to the claim for breach of the collective
bargaining agreement, 2 2 then the state tort claim will be preempted

under Andrews 2 3 and Magnuson2 14 but not under Raybourn.215 Therefore, the Raybourn rule, premised upon distinct legal composition
instead of factual composition and relationship, is distinguishable

from the Magnuson rule. 216 The two rules will be further distinguished
21 7
below by applying the Magnuson rule to the facts of Raybourn.

Raybourn's claims for false arrest and imprisonment were based
on conduct by railroad representatives who were acting under the
belief that Raybourn was intoxicated during working hours. 28 The

allegedly tortious conduct of the representatives occurred in the
employment setting, 2 9 although the conduct did not occur in the
context of a disciplinary investigation as in DeTomaso. 0 At the time
the allegedly tortious conduct occurred, the grievance and arbitration
procedures of the collective bargaining agreement were applicable.Y2

212. See, e.g., Raybourn, 602 F. Supp. at 386 (conduct on the part of the railroad
representatives was sufficient to give rise to a federal claim for breach of the collective
bargaining agreement as well as to state claims of false arrest and imprisonment).
213. See Andrews v. Louisville & N. R.R., 406 U.S. 320, 324 (1972) (state claim for

wrongful discharge based on facts giving rise to a federal claim for breach of employment
contract preempted by the RLA).
214. See Magnuson v. Burlington N., Inc., 576 F.2d 1367, 1369 (9th Cir. 1978) (state claim
for intentional infliction of emotional distress based on a matrix of facts giving rise to a
federal claim for wrongful discharge arising out of a breach of the collective bargaining
agreement preempted by the RLA).
215. See Raybourn v. Burlington N. R.R., 602 F. Supp. 385, 387 (1985) (state tort claims
for false arrest and imprisonment based on facts giving rise to a claim for breach of the
collective bargaining agreement not preempted by the RLA because the state tort claims deemed
legally independent).
216. See DeTomaso v. Pan Am. World Airways, Inc., 43 Cal. 3d 517, 527-30, 733 P.2d
614, 619-21, 235 Cal. Rptr. 292, 297-300 (1987) (the Raybourn rule is inconsistent with the
Magnuson rule).
217. See infra notes 218-27 and accompanying text (discussion of the Magnuson rule applied
to the facts of Raybourn).
218. Raybourn v. Burlington N. R.R., 602 F. Supp. 385, 385-86 (W.D. Mo. 1985). See
supra text accompanying note IlI (discussion of the facts of Raybourn).
219. Raybourn, 602 F. Supp. at 385-86 (the representatives took Raybourn from the work
premises to a hospital during the course of working hours).
220. Id. (although the representatives were investigating Raybourn's possible intoxication,
the representatives were not conducting a disciplinary investigation). In DeTomaso, the Pan
Am agents conducted a formal disciplinary investigation, pursuant to the collective bargaining
agreement. DeTomaso v. Pan Am. World Airways, Inc., 43 Cal. 3d 517, 521-23, 733 P.2d
614, 616-17, 235 Cal. Rptr. 292, 294-95 (1987).
221. See DeTomaso, 43 Cal. 3d at 529-30, 733 P.2d at 621-22, 235 Cal. Rptr. at 299-300.
The Raybourn court incorrectly reasoned that the grievance and arbitration procedures first
applied when Raybourn appealed his termination from employment, after the allegedly tortious
conduct occurred. Raybourn, 602 F. Supp. at 386. Since the allegedly tortious conduct occurred
within the context of the employment relation, the conduct was inextricably intertwined with
the collective bargaining agreement. See Magnuson v. Burlington N., Inc., 576 F.2d 1367,
1369 (9th Cir. 1978).

Pacific Law Journal / Vol. 19

Applying the Magnuson rule, Raybourn's claims for false arrest and
imprisonment were inextricably intertwined with the collective bar222
gaining agreement and should have been preempted by the RLA,
unless the claims were based on "outrageous" conduct under the
Farmer exception.m
The Raybourn court held that the state tort claims were legally
independent of any potential claims for breach of the collective
bargaining agreement based on wrongful discharge and thus not
preempted by the RLA. 224 Despite the implication by the Raybourn
court that the conduct of the investigators was "outrageous," 225 the
court would have upheld the state tort claims had the conduct not been
"outrageous.''226 Hence, absent "outrageous" conduct, application
of the Magnuson rule to the facts of Raybourn yields an outcome
contrary to the result reached under the Raybourn rule. 227
CONCLUSION

The Raybourn rule is deficient in a number of respects and should
be abandoned in favor of the Magnuson rule. Raybourn is inconsistent with Andrews (RLA), Allis-Chalmers (LMRA), and Garmon
(NLRA). Furthermore, the Raybourn rule, in allowing a plaintiff to
characterize a claim for breach of the collective bargaining agreement
as a state tort claim, subverts the congressional policy underlying
federal law labor preemption.
The RLA grievance and arbitration procedures provide employees
with prompt resolution of disputes through the limited remedies of
reinstatement and back pay. The premise of RLA preemption is that
the speed and informality of the grievance and arbitration procedures
provide a quid pro quo for the relinquishment of the right to litigate
a claim and seek punitive damages. Congress intended federal law
to be the exclusive remedy in resolving claims for breach of the
222. See Magnuson, 576 F.2d at 1369 (claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress
inextricably intertwined with the grievance and arbitration procedures of the collective bargaining agreement and preempted by the RLA). See supra text accompanying notes 102-09
(discussion of the Magnuson rule).
223. Magnuson, 576 F.2d at 1369 (recognizing the Farmer exception for "outrageous"
conduct). See supra text accompanying notes 106-09 (discussion of the Farmer exception).
224. Raybourn v. Burlington N. R.R., 602 F. Supp. 385, 387-88 (1985).

225.

See id. at 388 (omitting direct reference to Farmer).

226.

See id. at 387-88 (the court holding that the state tort claims were legally independent

of the claim for breach of the collective bargaining agreement irrespective of the conduct being
"outrageous").
227. See supra text accompanying notes 218-26 (Raybourn's state tort claims are preempted
under the Magnuson rule but not under the Raybourn rule).
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collective bargaining agreement. A plaintiff cannot change the federal
remedy by filing a state claim.
In summary, any utility derived from the Raybourn rule does not
counterbalance the inconsistency and confusion which the rule adds
to the field of RLA preemption. DeTomaso precludes any use of
Raybourn in California. Given the recent rulings in Caterpillar,Inc.
v. Williams228 (LMRA) and Atchison, Topeka & Santa Fe Ry. v.
Buell2 9 (RLA and FELA), the United States Supreme Court would
likely adopt Magnuson and reject Raybourn.
Scott Ross Belkin

228. 55 U.S.L.W. 4804, 4806 (U.S. June 9, 1987) (No. 86-526) (state claims which are
substantially dependent upon the terms of a collective bargaining agreement are preempted by
section 301 of the LMRA). See supra text accompanying notes 60-63 (discussion of the
Caterpillardecision).
229. 107 S. Ct. 1410 (1987). FELA claims are not inextricably intertwined with RLA
collective bargaining agreements. See id. at 1415. See supra text accompanying notes 127-33
(discussion of the Buell decision).

